The optimal allocation of prizes in contests: An auction approach

Kiho Yoon

No 1207, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University

Abstract: We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total e¢çort or the expected highest e¢çort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive all the results in Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558) incomplete-information model of contests as well as other results in a particularly simple fashion.

Keywords: Contests; Optimal structure; Prizes; All-pay auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iek:wpaper:1207

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