On asymmetry in all-pay auctions

Kiho Yoon

No 1208, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University

Abstract: This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players' valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes a¢çect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players' valuations increases total expenditures but an increase in asymmetry among players' valuations tends to decrease total expenditures both under complete and incomplete information.

Keywords: Asymmetry; All-pay auctions; Contests; Optimal mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iek:wpaper:1208

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