Strategic approval voting in a large electorate

Jean-François Laslier

No 405, IDEP Working Papers from Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France

Abstract: The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters. It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidate scores, rational voters vote sincerly. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2004-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic approval voting in a large electorate (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iep:wpidep:0405

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