Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment

Juergen Bracht (), Charles Figuieres and Marisa Ratto

No 409, IDEP Working Papers from Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France

Abstract: The paper reports on experiments designed to compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods problems. One mechanism rewards and penalizes deviations from the average contribution of the other agents to the public good (tax-subsidy mechanism). Another mechanism allows agents to subsidize the other agents’ contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contribution to the public good. The tax-subsidy mechanism allows for good point prediction of the average level of contribution. The compensation mechanism predicts the level of contributions less reliably.

Keywords: Public Goods; Voluntary Provision; Incentive Mechanisms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment (2008)
Working Paper: Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment (2008)
Working Paper: Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iep:wpidep:0409

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