On the Segregative Properties of Endogenous Jurisdiction Formation with a Central Government

Rongili Biswas (), Nicolas Gravel () and Remy Oddou

No 802, IDEP Working Papers from Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France

Abstract: This paper examines the segregative properties of endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation à la Tiebout in the presence of a central government who redistributes income across jurisdictions by maximizing a welfarist objective. Choices of location by households of local public good provision by jurisdiction and of redistribution by the central government are assumed to be made simultaneously, taking the choices of others as given. Two welfarist objectives for the central government are considered in turn: Leximin and Utilitarianism. If the central government pursues a Leximin objective, it is easily shown that the only stable jurisdiction structure that can emerge is essentially the trivial one in which all households live in the same jurisdiction. Richer classes of stable jurisdiction structures are compatible with a central utilitarian government. Yet, it happens that, if individual preferences are additively separable, the class of preferences that garantee the segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure remains unchanged by the presence of a central government.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2008-29-05, Revised 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.idep-fr.org/IMG/document/dt/dt0802.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iep:wpidep:0802

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IDEP Working Papers from Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gregory Cornu ().