SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CRIME DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN FACILITATING DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR
Antoni Calvó-Armengol and
Yves Zenou
International Economic Review, 2004, vol. 45, issue 3, 939-958
Abstract:
Delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. We study the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals. We show that multiple equilibria with different numbers of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior (2003)
Working Paper: Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behaviour (2003)
Working Paper: Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior (2003)
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