Pay all subjects or pay only some? An experiment on decision-making under risk and ambiguity

Ilke Aydogan (), Loïc Berger () and Vincent Theroude ()
Additional contact information
Ilke Aydogan: IESEG School of Management, Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie´ Management, F-59000 Lille, France; and iRisk Research Center on Risk and Uncertainty
Loïc Berger: CNRS, Univ. Lille, IESEG School of Management, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie´ Management, F-59000 Lille,France; iRisk Research Center on Risk and Uncertainty; RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment (EIEE), and Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici, Italy
Vincent Theroude: Université de Lorraine, Université de Strasbourg, CNRS, BETA, 54000, Nancy, France

Working Papers from IESEG School of Management

Abstract: We investigate the validity of a double random incentive system where only a subset of subjects is paid for one of their choices. By focusing on individual decisionmaking under risk and ambiguity, we show that using either a standard random incentive system, where all subjects are paid, or a double random system, where only 10% of subjects are paid, yields similar preference elicitation results. These findings suggest that adopting a double random incentive system could significantly reduce experimental costs and logistic e orts, thereby facilitating the exploration of individual decision-making in larger-scale and higher-stakes experiments.

Keywords: Experimental methodology; Payment methods; Incentives; Ambiguity elicitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ieseg.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/2024-iRisk-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ies:wpaper:e202417

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from IESEG School of Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lies BOUTEN ().