Do Governments Sway European Court of Justice Decision-making?: Evidence from Government Court Briefs

Clifford Carrubba and Matthew Gabel ()
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Clifford Carrubba: Department of Political Science, Emory University
Matthew Gabel: Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky

No 2005-06, Working Papers from University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations

Abstract: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is commonly described as a powerful international force for legal integration. Indeed, past studies indicate that the ECJ has developed a supranational legal order that trumps national law in a broad range of economic policy areas. But this depiction of an autonomous Court driving European integration beyond the desires of the member-states is dubious. We would expect the Court, whose existence depends on an international treaty and whose authority depends on national enforcement, to have strong incentives to decide cases with an eye to concerns of national governments. We argue that past studies -- which were based on a small number of case studies -- cannot demonstrate whether the Court is or is not sensitive to member-state interests. Based on novel dataset of all ECJ decisions over three years, we develop an empirical test of member-state influence on ECJ decisions and demonstrate that the Court does temper its decisions to accommodate member-state concerns.

JEL-codes: H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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