Choice in the presence of experts: the role of general practitioners in patients' hospital choice
Walter Beckert (w.beckert@bbk.ac.uk) and
Kate Collyer
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Kate Collyer: Institute for Fiscal Studies
No W16/21, IFS Working Papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies
Abstract:
This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of patients' hospital choice for elective medical procedures when their choice set is pre-selected by a general practitioner (GP). It proposes a two-stage choice model that encompasses both, patient and GP level optimization, and it discusses identifi cation. The empirical analysis demonstrates biases and inconsistencies that arise when strategic pre-selection is not properly taken into account. We fi nd that patients defer to GPs when assessing hospital quality and focus on tangible attributes, like hospital amenities; and that GPs, in turn, as patients' agents present choice options based on quality, but as agents of health authorities also consider their financial implications.
Keywords: Discrete choice; patient; principal; GP; agent; expert; endogenous choice sets; competition; hospital choice; elective medical procedure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-14
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Journal Article: Choice in the presence of experts: The role of general practitioners in patients’ hospital choice (2018)
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