Commitment Devices: Nice or Mean Means

Michael Möcker
Additional contact information
Michael Möcker: Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik, FernUniversität in Hagen, Hagen, Germany

International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE), 2014, vol. 3, issue 1, 13-35

Abstract: Commitment devices are regularly celebrated as an easy-to-use, budget way to dodge self-control problems. Analysis of a Bénabou and Tirole-style signaling game (2004) casts doubts on this view. Adding a commitment device to the standard model reveals difficulties: An agent relying on a commitment device to restrain his future self is less restrained in the present. Committing to do an unpleasant activity in the future leads to procrastination as the signaling effect of doing it now disappears. Therefore some agents may be better off without access to commitment devices. Policy implications are discussed.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://services.igi-global.com/resolvedoi/resolve. ... 018/ijabe.2014010102 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jabe00:v:3:y:2014:i:1:p:13-35

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE) is currently edited by Yun Wan

More articles in International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE) from IGI Global
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journal Editor ().