Reference-Dependent Preferences and Overbidding in Private and Common Value Auctions

Mariano Gabriel Runco
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Mariano Gabriel Runco: Auburn University at Montgomery, USA

International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE), 2020, vol. 9, issue 2, 20-37

Abstract: This paper proposes a model of reference dependent preferences to explain overbidding in private and common value auctions. It is assumed that the reference point is proportional to the value of the object and that losses are weighed more heavily than gains in the utility function. Equilibrium bidding strategies are derived for first- and second-price private and common value auctions. I find that this model fits the data of all experiments analyzed, both private and common value, better in terms of the Bayesian Information Criterion than a standard risk neutral model; moreover, it explains overbidding in all private value and some common value auctions better than other alternative models. These results suggest that reference dependence, among other factors, might play a role in the widespread tendency of subjects to overbid in most experimental auctions.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jabe00:v:9:y:2020:i:2:p:20-37

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