Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Torsten Persson (torsten.persson@iies.su.se),
Gérard Roland and
Guido Tabellini
No 100, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University
Abstract:
Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave scope for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps preventing the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interests between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other at the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.
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