Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem

Martin Dufwenberg and Amrish Patel

No 521, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical. Neither cost-sharing nor reciprocity in isolation can solve the problem, but together they have that potential. We introduce new network notions of reciprocity relations to better understand this. Our analysis uncovers an intricate web of nuances that demonstrate the attainable yet elusive nature of a unique outcome.Keywords: Discrete public good, participation, reciprocity networks, coordination, cost-sharing JEL codes: C72, D03, H41.

Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Reciprocity networks and the participation problem (2017)
Working Paper: Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem (2014)
Working Paper: Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem (2014)
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