Oil Prices and Interstate Conflict Behavior

Cullen S. Hendrix ()
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Cullen S. Hendrix: Peterson Institute for International Economics

No WP14-3, Working Paper Series from Peterson Institute for International Economics

Abstract: Anecdotal evidence suggests high oil prices embolden leaders in oil-rich states to pursue more aggressive foreign policies. This article tests the conjecture in a sample of 153 countries for the time period 1947–2001. It finds strong evidence of a contingent effect of oil prices on interstate disputes, with high oil prices associated with signifi cant increases in dispute behavior among oil-exporting states, while having either a negative or null effect on dispute behavior in nonexporting states.

Keywords: oil; conflict; diplomacy; Russia; Iran; Venezuela; resource curse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 Q41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cis, nep-cwa and nep-ene
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp14-3

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