WTO'ing a Resolution to the China Subsidy Problem

Chad Bown and Jennifer Hillman ()
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Jennifer Hillman: Georgetown University Law Center

No WP19-17, Working Paper Series from Peterson Institute for International Economics

Abstract: The United States, European Union, and Japan have begun a trilateral process to confront the Chinese economic model, including its use of industrial subsidies and deployment of state-owned enterprises. This paper seeks to identify the main areas of tension and to assess the legal-economic challenges to constructing new rules to address the underlying conflict. It begins by providing a brief history of subsidy disciplines in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) predating any concerns introduced by China. It then describes contemporary economic problems with China's approach to subsidies, their impact, and the apparent ineffectiveness of the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) to address them. Finally, it calls for increased efforts to measure and pinpoint the source of the problems--in a manner analogous to how the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) took on agricultural subsidies in the 1980s--before providing a legal-economic assessment of proposals for reforms to notifications, evidence, remedies, enforcement, and the definition of a subsidy.

Keywords: WTO; subsidy; state-owned enterprise; dispute settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-his and nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: WTO'ing a Resolution to the China Subsidy Problem (2019)
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