Are auditors unable to detect classification shifting or merely not willing to report it? Evidence from India
Naman Desai and
Neerav Nagar
No WP2016-03-22, IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department
Abstract:
Prior research suggests that Big-4 auditors fail to curb classification shifting in the countries with weak legal institutions. However, it is not known whether the auditors are unable to detect the use of this earnings management tool or if they are able to detect such misclassifications but are not motivated to report them. We conduct two experiments to examine this issue. Our results indicate that, auditors are sensitive to various types of classification shifting while assessing fraud risk and audit effort. However, their willingness to report such discretionary earnings management is affected by the overall legal liability regimes and institutional controls of the region in which their clients operate. More specifically, our results indicate that the presence of weak legal institutions in a country reduces the litigation risk faced by auditors which make them less likely to report misclassifications. On the other hand, auditors are significantly more likely to report misclassifications by qualifying their audit report if, a company is cross listed in a country with strong institutional controls and legal regime.
Date: 2016-04-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:14482
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().