Discrimination against foreigners in the U.S. patent system

Gaétan de Rassenfosse and Reza Hosseini
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Reza Hosseini: Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne

Working Papers from Chair of Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy

Abstract: Inventions of foreign origin are about ten percentage points less likely to be granted a U.S. patent than domestic inventions. An empirical analysis of 1.5 million U.S. patent applications identifies three systematic differences between foreign and domestic patent applications that partly explain this bias. They include differences in patent agents, the financial resources of the applicants, and the level of effort that applicants put into the prosecution process. We find no evidence of disparate treatment (‘intentional discrimination’) of foreigners. Instead, our evidence points to a disparate impact (‘unintentional discrimination’) of the U.S. patent system on foreign inventors. Our results suggest unequal access to the patent system for foreigners compared to locals (but also for small U.S. firms). Giving examiners the power of (truly) rejecting a patent application may be one solution to level the playing field between foreigners and locals, but also between large and small firms.

Keywords: foreign bias; discrimination; disparate impact; national treatment principle; patent system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F52 K11 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-law and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Journal Article: Discrimination against foreigners in the U.S. patent system (2020)
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