Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory v selective prosecution
Nuno Garoupa
No 2008-04, Working Papers from Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales
Abstract:
Mandatory prosecution is inefficient according to legal economists. We argue that when prosecutors are fairly insulated from their performance or are highly risk averse mandatory prosecution is better than selective prosecution. This result has important implications for comparative law since mandatory prosecution generally prevails in civil law jurisdictions whereas selective prosecution is typical of common law jurisdictions.
Keywords: prosecutors; mandatory prosecution; selective prosecution; civil law; common law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-02-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics
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Journal Article: Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2008-04
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