Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems

Francoise Forges and Roberto Serrano

No 2011-14, Working Papers from Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales

Abstract: This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.

Keywords: strategic externalities; informational externalities; exchange economies; cooperative games with orthogonal coalitions; non-cooperative bayesian games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Forthcoming in International Game Theory Review

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Related works:
Journal Article: COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS (2013)
Working Paper: Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems (2013)
Working Paper: Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems (2011)
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