Detrimental Effects of Retention Regulation: Incentives for Loan Screening in Securitization under Asymmetric Information

Masazumi Hattori and Kazuhiko Ohashi
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Masazumi Hattori: Director and Senior Economist, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan (E-mail: masazumi.hattori @boj.or.jp)
Kazuhiko Ohashi: Professor, Hitotsubashi University (E-mail: kohashi@ics.hit-u.jp)

No 11-E-17, IMES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan

Abstract: We consider an economy in which a lender finances his loans to borrowers by issuing a securitized product to investors, and where the credit quality of the product may depend on whether the lender screens the borrowers. In the presence of asymmetric information between the lender and the investors about the credit quality of potential borrowers, overvaluation of the low-quality securitized product may occur, inducing lender to not screen the borrowers and hence to issue a securitized product of low credit quality. This is likely to occur when the investors finds it difficult to distinguish the good state from the bad state, or when the seed of recession creeps toward the booming economy. A retention regulation that requires the lender to hold a minimum ratio of his own securitized products is not necessarily effective in solving this incentive problem. Even worse, in a certain situation, the retention regulation discourages the lender's screening effort and reduces welfare.

Keywords: originate-to-distribute; securitization; asymmetric information; financial regulation; screening; verification; retention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G21 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cta and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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