Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation?

Annelise Riles
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Annelise Riles: Jack G. Clarke Professor of Far East Legal Studies, Cornell Law School (E-mail: ar254@cornell.edu)

No 13-E-01, IMES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan

Abstract: A central challenge for international financial regulatory systems today is how to manage the impact of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) on the global economy, given the interconnected and pluralistic nature of regulatory regimes. This article focuses on the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and proposes a new research agenda regarding the FSB fs emerging regulatory forms. In particular, it examines the regulatory architecture of New Governance (NG), a variety of approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and experimental than traditional forms of governance. A preliminary conclusion is that NG tools may be effective in resolving some kinds of problems in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely to be suitable to all problems. As such, this article proposes that analyses of the precise conditions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be effective are necessary. It concludes with some recommendations for improving the NG model.

Keywords: International Financial Regulation; Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions; Financial Stability Board; Regulatory Reform; New Governance; Regulatory Pluralism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-law
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