The Internal Job Market of the IMF's Economist Program

International Monetary Fund

No 2004/190, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper shows how the internal job market for participants in the IMF Economist Program (EPs) could be redesigned to eliminate most of the shortcomings of the current system. The new design is based on Gale and Shapley's (1962) Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) and generates an efficient and stable outcome. An Excel-based computer program, EPMatch, implements the algorithm and applies it to the internal job market for EPs. The program can be downloaded from http://www.people.hbs.edu/gbarron/EPMatch_ for_Excel.html

Keywords: WP; preference matrix; market maker; eps exhibit; transferring eps; eps rank; rankings of department; Matching; stability; marriage problem; deferred acceptance algorithm; Gale-Shapley; entry-level job market; rankings of the department; eps' ROLs; eps' ranking; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2004-10-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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