Governance Structures and Decision-Making Roles in Inflation-Targeting Central Banks

Anita Tuladhar

No 2005/183, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper surveys decision-making roles of governing bodies of central banks that have formally adopted inflation targeting as a monetary framework. Governance practices seek to balance institutional independence needed for monetary policy credibility with accountability required to protect democratic values. Central bank laws usually have price stability as the primary monetary policy objective but seldom require an explicit numerical inflation target. Governments are frequently involved in setting targets, but to ensure operational autonomy, legal provisions explicitly limit government influence in internal policy decision-making processes. Internal governance practices differ considerably with regard to the roles and inter-relationships between the policy, supervisory, and management boards of a central bank.

Keywords: WP; government; country; central bank; committee; government index; monetary policy; Inflation targeting; governance; central bank independence; price stability; government override; board of governors; member state; government involvement; decision-making authority; state secretary; government representation; override authority; government directive; emerging market country; government staff; Price stabilization; Inflation; Consumer price indexes; Renewable resources; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2005-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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