Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes: Evidence From the Caribbean

Rupa Duttagupta and Guillermo Tolosa

No 2006/119, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper assesses the nature of fiscal discipline under alternative exchange rate regimes. First, it shows in a simple theoretical framework that fiscal agencies under a currency union with a fixed exchange rate can have the largest incentive to overspend or "free-ride" (compared to those under other exchange rate regimes) owing to their ability to spread the costs of overspending in terms of the inflation tax across both time-given the fixed exchange rate-and space-given the currency union. In contrast, such free-riding behavior does not arise under flexible regimes owing to the immediate inflationary impact of spending. Next, empirically, it shows that fiscal stances in countries with fixed pegs and currency unions regime demonstrate greater free-riding behavior than countries with more flexible regimes in 15 Caribbean countries during 1983-2004.

Keywords: WP; exchange rate; central bank; Fiscal policy; currency unions; exchange rates; FPCU regime; ECCU country; utility function; inflation cost; dislike inflation; aggregate government budget constraint; budget constraint; exchange rate case; ECCU member; money growth; ECCU member country; common currency; Exchange rate arrangements; Conventional peg; Fiscal stance; Monetary unions; Caribbean (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2006-05-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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