Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions

Andrei Levchenko and Quy-Toan Do

No 2006/056, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: We analyze the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions, such as contract enforcement, rule of law, and property rights. In our model, firms differ in their preferences for institutional quality, which is determined endogenously in a political economy framework. We show that trade opening can worsen institutions when it increases the political power of a small elite of large exporters who prefer to maintain bad institutions. The detrimental effect of trade on institutions is most likely to occur when a small country captures a sufficiently large share of world exports in sectors characterized by economic profits.

Keywords: WP; fixed cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54
Date: 2006-02-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions (2009)
Working Paper: Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions (2006)
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