The New Economics of Capital Controls Imposed for Prudential Reasons+L4888

Anton Korinek

No 2011/298, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper provides an introduction to the new economics of prudential capital controls in emerging economies. This literature is based on the notion that there are externalities associated with financial crises because individual market participants do not internalize their contribution to aggregate financial instability when they make their finacing decisions. As a result they impose externalities in the form of greater financial instability on each other, and the private financing decisions of individuals are distorted towards excessive risk-taking. We discuss how prudential capital controls can induce private agents to internalize these externalities and thereby increase macroeconomic stability and enhance welfare.

Keywords: WP; short-term debt; long-term debt; Pareto efficiency; financial crises; balance sheet effects; pecuniary externalities; capital controls; pecuniary externality; foreign currency; price movement; Exchange rates; Asset prices; Financial statements; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2011-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (84)

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