Rules, Discretion, and Macro-Prudential Policy

Itai Agur and Sunil Sharma

No 2013/065, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: The paper examines the implementation of macro-prudential policy. Given the coordination, flow of information, analysis, and communication required, macro-prudential frameworks will have weaknesses that make it hard to implement policy. And dealing with the political economy is also likely to be challenging. But limiting discretion through the formulation of macro-prudential rules is complicated by the difficulties in detecting and measuring systemic risk. The paper suggests that oversight is best served by having a strong baseline regulatory regime on which a time-varying macro-prudential policy can be added as conditions warrant and permit.

Keywords: WP; central bank; bank regulator; regulator; bank; market; Macro-prudential policy; systemic risk; financial stability; regulation; input consist; markets regulator; market liquidity; liquid asset; repo market; central bank leadership; Liquidity; Systemic risk assessment; Commercial banks; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2013-03-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40379 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2013/065

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().