Playing by the Rules: Reforming Fiscal Governance in Europe

Luc Eyraud and Tao Wu

No 2015/067, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: The paper contributes to the discussions on fiscal governance in Europe. It takes stock of recent reforms, identifies areas for further progress, and discusses a menu of policy options for the medium-term. The issues covered include: (i) the growing complexity of the European framework and ways to simplify it; (ii) the difficulties to measure and implement structural stance indicators; (iii) the challenge of reconciling fiscal sustainability and growth; (iv) the need to enhance coordination in the area of monitoring; and (v) the obstacles to compliance and proposals to strengthen enforcement.

Keywords: WP; debt ceiling; potential GDP; debt ratio; federal government; member country; Fiscal Policy; Fiscal Rules; EMU; interest rate; central government; output gap measurement error; deficit rule; debt level; debt rule; government ability; debt increase; euro area country; output gap data; Fiscal stance; Fiscal governance; Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50
Date: 2015-03-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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