Legal Protection: Liability and Immunity Arrangements of Central Banks and Financial Supervisors

Ashraf Khan

No 2018/176, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper argues that central bank legal protection contributes to safeguarding a central bank and its financial supervisor’s independence, especially for conducting monetary and financial stability policy. However, such legal protection also entails enhanced accountability. To this end, the paper provides a selected overview of legal protection for central banks and financial supervisors (if the supervisor is part of the central bank), focusing on liability, immunity, and indemnification arrangements, and based on the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database. The paper also uses data from the IMF’s Article IV and FSAP Database, and the IMF MCM’s Technical Assistance Database. It lists selected country cases for illustrative purposes. It introduces the concepts of “appropriate legal protection” and “function-specific legal protection” as topics for further research.

Keywords: WP; central bank; government; country; monetary policy; staff; central banking; financial supervision; financial regulation; law; liability; immunity; technical assistance; central bank law; civil servant statute; State agency; central bank staff; liability standard; central bank liability; central bank governor; indemnification arrangement; liability regime; central bank website; State liability; central bank liability standard; Central bank legislation; Legal support in revenue administration; Central bank autonomy; Central bank governance; Global; Asia and Pacific; financial supervisor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 2018-08-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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