Delegation and emission tax in a differentiated oligopoly

Rupayan Pal

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of product market competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation, irrespective of the mode of competition. The possibility of emission tax rate to be positive and lower for more differentiated products, under quantity (price) competition, is higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation. It also shows that, under quantity (price) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation.

Keywords: Emission tax; price competition; product differentiation; quantity competition; strategic managerial delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 L13 Q50 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-env and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2009-007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: DELEGATION AND EMISSION TAX IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY (2012)
Working Paper: Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2009-007

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