Incomplete contracts, incentives and economic power
Sripad Motiram ()
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Sripad Motiram: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India
Abstract:
This paper formalizes ideas from classical and radical political economy on task allocation and technology adoption under capitalism. A few previous studies have attempted this, but the framework and results in this paper are different. I model labor contracts that are incomplete owing to unforeseen/indescribable contingencies, leading to Pareto-improving renegotiation and a hold-up problem. Given path dependence, the allocation is sub-optimal, with the extent of inefficiency depending upon the degree of incompleteness. This model captures insights from the above literature on the microeconomic roots of inefficiency and power. It also provides a concrete setting where indescribable contingencies do (or don't) matter - a much-debated issue.
Keywords: Incomplete Contracts; Unforeseen/Indescribeable Contingencies; Hold-Up; Classical and Radical Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B1 B2 D21 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2010-011
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