Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with asymmetric sellers

Amit Kumar Maurya () and Shubhro Sarkar ()
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Amit Kumar Maurya: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
Shubhro Sarkar: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: In a multilateral bargaining problem with one buyer and two heterogeneous sellers owning perfectly complementary units, we find that there exists an equilibrium which leads to inefficient delays when the buyer negotiates with the higher-valuation seller first and where players are extremely impatient. We also find that the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first, except in an equilibrium where both the buyer and the lower-valuation seller choose to play strategies that lead negotiations between them to hold out.

Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; Bargaining order; Asymmetric sellers; Complete information; Subgame Perfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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