Revenue non-equivalence in multidimensional procurement auctions under asymmetry

Shivangi Chandel () and Shubhro Sarkar ()
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Shivangi Chandel: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
Shubhro Sarkar: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: Using an example we show that the Revenue Equivalence in the Scoring Auctions, as postulated by Che (1993), no longer holds when the suppliers are asymmetric in their costs of production.

Keywords: Auctions; Public Procurement; Asymmetric Bidders; Multidimensional Bids (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2014-008

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