Discouraged worker effect in public works programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India

Sudha Narayanan, Upasak Das, Yanyan Liu () and Christopher Barrett
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Upasak Das: Centre for Development Studies

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This study investigates the consequences of poor implementation in public workfare programs, focusing on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. Using nationally representative data, we test empirically for a discouraged worker effect arising from either of two mechanisms: administrative rationing of jobs among those who seek work and delays in wage payments. We find strong evidence at the household and district levels that administrative rationing discourages subsequent demand for work. Delayed wage payments seem to matter significantly during rainfall shocks. We find further that rationing is strongly associated with indicators of implementation ability such as staff capacity. Politics appears to play only a limited role. The findings suggest that assessments of the relevance of public programs over their lifecycle need to factor in implementation quality.

Keywords: administrative rationing; discouraged worker effect; employment guarantee; India; labor supply; MGNREGA; workfare programs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J08 J38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: The “Discouraged Worker Effect” in Public Works Programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2016-027

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