Externalities, entry bias and optimal subsidy policy in oligopoly

Rupayan Pal and Ruichao Song
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Ruichao Song: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This article analyses alternative subsidy schemes and long-run entry bias in a new industry that creates positive environmental externalities. It demonstrates that per unit subsidy scheme, despite attracting fewer firms, results in higher industry output and economic surplus in the equilibrium compared to the expenditure equivalent lump-sum subsidy scheme. However, the later leads to higher total surplus, unless spill-over externalities is sufficiently small. Further, free entry equilibrium number of firms may be excessive or insufficient. The first best equilibrium outcome can be implemented through a unique combination of per unit subsidy and lump sum subsidy/tax, which involves positive government expenditure.

Keywords: Positive externalities; Environmental benefit; Free entry; Cournot Oligopoly; Expenditure equivalent subsidy schemes; Social Optimum (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H23 L52 Q48 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-env and nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2019-028

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