Wolf Pack Activism

Alon Brav (), Amil Dasgupta () and Richmond Mathews ()
Additional contact information
Alon Brav: Duke University, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, North Carolina 27708; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; European Corporate Governance Institute, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Amil Dasgupta: European Corporate Governance Institute, 1000 Brussels, Belgium; Department of Finance, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
Richmond Mathews: Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742

Management Science, 2022, vol. 68, issue 8, 5557-5568

Abstract: Blockholder monitoring is central to corporate governance, but blockholders large enough to exercise significant unilateral influence are rare. Mechanisms that enable moderately sized blockholders to exert collective influence are therefore important. Existing theory suggests that engagement by moderately sized blockholders is unlikely, especially when the blocks are held by delegated asset managers who have limited skin in the game. We present a model in which multiple delegated blockholders engage target management in parallel, that is, “wolf pack activism.” Delegation reduces skin in the game, which decreases incentives for engagement. However, it also induces competition over investor capital (i.e., competition for flow). We show that this increases engagement incentives and helps ameliorate the problem of insufficient engagement, although it can also foster excess engagement. Under competition for flow, the total amount of capital seeking skilled activist managers is relevant to engagement incentives, which helps to predict when and where wolf packs arise. Flow incentives are particularly valuable in incentivizing engagement by packs with smaller members.

Keywords: shareholder activism; institutional investors; competition for flow; activist hedge funds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4131 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:8:p:5557-5568

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().