Lender Trust and Bank Loan Contracts

Jens Hagendorff (), Sonya Lim () and Duc Duy Nguyen ()
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Jens Hagendorff: King’s College London, London WC2B 4BG, United Kingdom
Sonya Lim: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois 60604
Duc Duy Nguyen: Durham University, Durham DH1 3LB, United Kingdom

Management Science, 2023, vol. 69, issue 3, 1758-1779

Abstract: We examine the contractual implications of a lender’s trust for corporate loans. We measure how trusting a lender is using the average trust attitude in the chief executive officer’s ancestral country of origin. We find that banks with trusting CEOs charge lower interest rates in U.S. syndicated loans. This effect is identified within existing lender–borrower relationships and similar types of loans. Further analyses indicate that trust reduces the cost of credit by boosting the perceived credibility of borrower information and by mitigating contracting problems. We corroborate our findings by conducting a survey of loan officers with experience in loan syndication.

Keywords: CEOs; trust; cultural values; financial contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:3:p:1758-1779

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