Disclosure Substitution

Mirko Heinle (), Delphine Samuels () and Daniel Taylor ()
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Mirko Heinle: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Delphine Samuels: The University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, Chicago, Illinois 60637
Daniel Taylor: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Management Science, 2023, vol. 69, issue 8, 4774-4789

Abstract: This study develops and tests a simple model of voluntary disclosure in which managers can choose to withhold (i.e., redact) certain elements from mandatory disclosure. We consider a setting in which mandatory disclosure is a disaggregated disclosure (e.g., a financial statement), voluntary disclosure is an aggregate disclosure (e.g., an earnings forecast), and the costs of each type of disclosure are distinct. In this setting, we show that managers endogenously substitute between the two types of disclosure; managers that choose to withhold information from mandatory disclosure are more likely to provide voluntary disclosure. We test our predictions using a comprehensive sample of mandatory disclosures in which the SEC allows the firm to redact information that would otherwise jeopardize its competitive position. Consistent with our predictions, we find strong evidence that redacted mandatory disclosure is associated with greater voluntary disclosure.

Keywords: voluntary disclosure; proprietary costs; disclosure substitution; redacted disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:8:p:4774-4789

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