Understanding Cooperation in an Intertemporal Context

Felix Kölle and Thomas Lauer ()
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Thomas Lauer: Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences (CEREB), University of Erfurt, 99089 Erfurt, Germany

Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 11, 7791-7810

Abstract: Cooperation between individuals, a critical component of organizational and societal success, typically involves costs and benefits that accrue at different points in time. Using a series of controlled experiments, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of cooperation in an intertemporal context. Our findings demonstrate that cooperation is significantly reduced when the benefits of cooperation are shifted into the future, whereas delaying costs leads to an increase in cooperation. Our analysis of the underlying behavioral mechanisms reveals that the change in the level of cooperation can be explained by three factors: (i) a shift in the beliefs about others’ efforts, (ii) a shift in the willingness to conditionally cooperate, and (iii) an individual’s degree of impatience. We further find that injunctive norms of cooperation are unaffected by the timing of consequences, indicating that changes in behavior are due to a change in norm compliance rather than the norm itself. Implications for management practices are discussed.

Keywords: cooperation; teams; patience; incentives; norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03757 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Understanding Cooperation in an Intertemporal Context (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:11:p:7791-7810

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