Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

Neil Newman (), Kevin Leyton-Brown (), Paul Milgrom () and Ilya Segal ()
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Neil Newman: Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
Kevin Leyton-Brown: Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
Paul Milgrom: Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
Ilya Segal: Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 11, 8187-8215

Abstract: This paper revisits the descending clock “reverse” auction design used in the U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s 2016–2017 “incentive auction.” We use extensive computational simulations to investigate the quantitative significance of various aspects of the design, leveraging a reverse auction simulator and realistic models of bidder values.

Keywords: incentive auction; deferred acceptance auction; reverse clock auction; spectrum auction; simulation; market design; auctions; artificial intelligence; applied game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:11:p:8187-8215

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