A Slot-Scheduling Mechanism at Congested Airports that Incorporates Efficiency, Fairness, and Airline Preferences

Jamie Fairbrother (), Konstantinos G. Zografos () and Kevin D. Glazebrook ()
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Jamie Fairbrother: Centre for Transport and Logistics, Department of Management Science, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom
Konstantinos G. Zografos: Centre for Transport and Logistics, Department of Management Science, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom
Kevin D. Glazebrook: Centre for Transport and Logistics, Department of Management Science, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom

Transportation Science, 2020, vol. 54, issue 1, 115–138

Abstract: Congestion is a problem at airports where capacity does not meet demand. At many such airports, airlines must request time slots for the purpose of landing or take off. Given the imbalance between demand and capacity, slot requests cannot always be scheduled as requested. The difference between the requested and allocated time slots is called displacement. Minimization of the total displacement is a key slot-scheduling objective and expresses the efficiency of the slot-scheduling process. Additionally, fairness has been proposed as a slot-scheduling criterion. Fairness relates to the allocation of the total schedule displacement among the various airlines. Single- and multiobjective models have been proposed for slot scheduling. However, currently the literature lacks models that incorporate the preferences of airlines regarding the allocation of displacement to their flights. This paper proposes a two-stage mechanism for the scheduling of slots at congested airports. The proposed mechanism considers efficiency and fairness objectives and incorporates the preferences of airlines in allocating the total displacement associated with the flights of each airline. The first stage of the mechanism constructs a reference schedule that is fair to the participating airlines. In the second stage, the airlines specify how the displacement allocated to them in the reference schedule should be distributed among their requests. The mechanism then adjusts the fair reference schedule to meet as many of these preferences as possible. The development and implementation of the proposed slot-scheduling mechanism is demonstrated using real data from a coordinated airport and simulated displacement preference data. The proposed slot-scheduling mechanism provides useful information to decision makers regarding the equity–efficiency trade-off and enhances the transparency and acceptability of the slot-scheduling outcome.

Keywords: airport slot scheduling; airport capacity management; slot-scheduling mechanism; biobjective slot scheduling; slot-scheduling fairness; integer linear programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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