Battlefield Bargains: The High-Stakes Dance of Rebel Finances and Ceasefire Deals

Sebastian Kupek ()

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck

Abstract: Wars fueled by resource wealth pose complex challenges for conflict resolution. I combine data on conflict events, rebel resource dependence, world market prices, and ceasefire details to investigate how fluctuations in rebel funding affect the likelihood of ceasefires. Increased funding opportunities strengthen the rebel position and decrease the bargaining range between belligerents. Higher resource rents prolong the conflict and make resolution less likely. Using the exogenous variation of world market prices, I find that rebels react strongly to changes in their budget situation. Price increases reduce the likelihood of rebels entering ceasefires connected to conflict resolution.

Keywords: ceasefires; civil conflict; natural resources; conflict resolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 F52 L70 O13 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 75
Date: 2025-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www2.uibk.ac.at/downloads/c9821000/wpaper/2025-04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2025-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Judith Courian ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).