Who's Getting the Office? Autocracy And Elected Politicians' Career Path: Evidence from the Mexican States

Julio Alberto Ramos-Pastrana (jramospa@indiana.edu)
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Julio Alberto Ramos-Pastrana: Indiana University

No 2017-008, CAEPR Working Papers from Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of autocracy on governors' career path. Using data from the Mexican states in the period 1995 to 2014, I exploit the variation provided by an exogenous political transition. Results show that autocratic states that experienced a transition elected governors that had 37.3 percentage points more technical or administrative experience than those governors from autocratic states that did not go through a transition. This finding supports the argument that autocratic regimes incentivize Mexican governors from the dominant party to pursue political careers, while candidates from the opposition parties choose careers with a technical or administrative focus.

Keywords: Autocracy; Politicians' Career Path; Political Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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