CEO Compensation among Firms Controlled by Large Shareholders: Evidence from Emerging Markets

Francisco Gallego and Borja Larrain ()

No 379, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: Using a novel data base for three emerging markets, we find that the type of large shareholder matters for CEO compensation. In particular, we find a compensation premium of about 30 log points for professional (not controller-related) CEOs working in firms controlled by a family compared to firms controlled by other large shareholders. The premium cannot be explained away by standard firm characteristics, observable executive skills (e.g., education or tenure), or the compensation of the CEO in herformer job. The premium comes mostly from family firms with absent founders and when sons are involved.

Keywords: CEO compensation; large shareholders; family firms; emerging markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 J3 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:379

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