A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes

Rodrigo Harrison and Pedro Jara-Moroni

No 440, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: Global games emerged as an approach to equilibrium selection. For a general setting with supermodular payoffs unique selection of equilibrium has been obtained through iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the case of global games with strategic substitutes, uniqueness of equilibrium has not been proved by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, making the equilibrium less appealing. In this work we study a simple three player binary action global game with strategic substitutes for which we provide a condition for dominance solvability. This opens an unexplored research agenda on the study of global games with strategic substitutes.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:440

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