Strategic data sales to competing firms

Flavio Delbono, Carlo Reggiani and Luca Sandrini

No 2021-05, JRC Working Papers on Digital Economy from Joint Research Centre

Abstract: The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing. We study the incentives of a data broker to sell data about a segment of the market to three competing firms. The segment only includes a share of the consumers in the market around one of the firms. Data are never sold exclusively. Despite the data are particularly tailored to the potential clientele of one of the firms, we show that the data broker has incentives to sell the list to its competitors. Such market outcome is not socially optimal, and a regulator that aims to maximise consumers and social welfare should consider mandating data sharing.

Keywords: data markets; personalised pricing; price discrimination; oligopoly; selling mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ipt:decwpa:202105

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