Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections

Massimiliano Ferraresi (), Leonzio Rizzo () and Alberto Zanardi ()
Additional contact information
Alberto Zanardi: University of Bologna, Italy

Working papers from Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica

Abstract: We use data for all Italian municipalities from 2001-2007 to empirically test the extent to which two different electoral rules, which hold for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions at local level. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single-ballot plurality rule where only one list can support her/him, while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule where multiple lists can support her/him. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones.

Keywords: federal budget; double-ballot; coalition; list; taxes; expenditure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H3 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.siepweb.it/siep/wp/wp-content/uploads/r ... t_al_WP_SIEP_679.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ipu:wpaper:13

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica Corso Strada Nuova 65 27100 Pavia Italia.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Monica Bozzano ().