Policymaking in the Eurozone and the Core Vs. Perifphery Problem

Stergios Skaperdas

No 101112, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: I argue that the eurozoneís current problems are primarily structural: A weak central bank; the absence of fiscal coordination; fragmented bank supervision with individual countries having the ultimate responsibility for supporting banks but without the ability to print their own currency. At the same time, European elites of the core have been driven by very short-term objectives whereas the Greek and Irish governments have shown no appetite to represent their own citizens in negotiations. In the absence of any moves towards political integration and to avoid a probable disorderly exit, it is critical to formally establish an opt-out clause for exit from the eurozone and, in the meantime, rapidly prepare procedures for such an exit.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba
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Journal Article: Policymaking in the Eurozone and the Core vs Periphery Problem (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:101112

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