The Rule Incentives that Rule Civil Justice

Daniela Marchesi
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Daniela Marchesi: ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses

No 85, ISAE Working Papers from ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY)

Abstract: The excessive length of civil judicial proceedings may be understood being the consequence of a disequilibrium between demand and supply of justice. A comparison between EU countries and a statistical and analytical investigation demonstrates that the problems do not rest in insufficient supply – which has been the general opinion – but in pathological demand for civil justice. Opportunistic behaviour incentivized by the procedural rules and by the excessive length of trials is at the root of such demand. Therefore changing the formula which determines lawyer’s fees should be the first reform introduced.

Keywords: Efficiency of civil justice; Comparison among EU countries and the Italian case; Supply of justice; Pathological demand of civil justice; Effectiveness of reforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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