Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem

Joana Pais ()

No 2006/13, Working Papers Department of Economics from ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa

Abstract: In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilib- rium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibrium where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we re- late equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.

Keywords: Matching; College Admissions Problem; Stability; Random Mechanism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Random matching in the college admissions problem (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp132006

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